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CAN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT KEEP PEOPLE
“SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS”?†
BRUCE A. GREEN*

In her Article, Something Rots in Law Enforcement and It’s the Search
Warrant: The Breonna Taylor Case,1 Professor Blanche Bong Cook, a legal
scholar and former prosecutor, digs deeply into the events leading to Breonna
Taylor’s death at the hands of the Louisville Metro Police Department
(“LMPD”). Cook shows that the central factual premise for searching Taylor’s
apartment for her ex-boyfriend’s drugs—namely, that the ex-boyfriend received
packages there—was almost certainly a lie;2 that even with that lie, the judge
should not have found probable cause to believe that drugs would be found in
Taylor’s apartment;3 that the judge also had no legitimate grounds to authorize
the police to force their way into Taylor’s residence without first knocking and
announcing themselves;4 and that the subsequent police account of the
circumstances of their invasion of Taylor’s residence was almost certainly
another lie, facilitated both by their failure to wear cameras or to turn them on
at the time of the search, and by the later opportunity—conventionally afforded
the police—to get their lies straight before answering questions.5
This is the unusual case of police misconduct where some measure of
accountability followed. In September 2020, the City of Louisville agreed to
compensate Taylor’s family and to make policing reforms, albeit without
acknowleding wrongdoing.6 And in August 2022, a federal grand jury indicted
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four of the police officers who had a role in the killing.7 But if the results had
not been so tragic, resulting in so much public outrage, the police misconduct
would probably have been ignored. If Taylor had survived, she would not have
filed a suppression motion in a criminal case because there would have been no
case against her: the police search found no evidence that she did anything
wrong.8 She would not have brought a civil rights action after the police invaded
her apartment because qualified immunity would almost certainly have
protected the police from liability.9 It seems unlikely that the state Attorney
General would have taken action,10 or that the police department would itself
have disciplined the officers involved or revisited its practices.
Cook levels some blame for Taylor’s death on the U.S. Supreme Court,11
which gives with one hand while taking with the other: while its Fourth
Amendment opinions recognize the sanctity of the home, the Court has also
eliminated incentives for the police to comply with the constitutional restrictions
when homes are searched. Cook takes special aim at Hudson v. Michigan,12
which held the exclusionary rule inapplicable when police violate the ordinary
requirement to knock and announce themselves before forcing their way into a
home.13 One might add that the Court has eviscerated the Fourth Amendment
remedies in many more ways than one. Even when, as in Taylor’s case, an
inattentive or indifferent judge issues a warrant unsupported by probable cause,
the police can ordinarily assume that if they happen to discover evidence, it will
be admissible under the so-called “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary

7
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Current and Former Louisville, Kentucky Police
Officers Charged with Federal Crimes Related to Death of Breonna Taylor (Aug. 4, 2022)
(available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/current-and-former-louisville-kentucky-policeofficers-charged-federal-crimes-related-death [https://perma.cc/J4NM-88GZ]). Previously,
the state charged one of the officers, Brett Hankinson, with wantonly endangering Taylor’s
neighbors by shooting blindly into the building; he was tried and acquitted in March 2022.
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Taylor Case; Protesters Wanted Stronger Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2020.
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Cook, supra note 1, at 7 (“A confluence of the War on Drugs, the subsequent
militarization of policing, and the Supreme Court’s gradual erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections facilitated Taylor’s death.”).
12
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
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Id. at 589; see also Cook, supra note 1, at 8, 55-60, 81.
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rule.14 Other Supreme Court decisions limit who has standing to challenge illegal
searches,15 so that if evidence were discovered illegally in Breonna Taylor’s
apartment, her ex-boyfriend, who was not present, could not challenge the
unlawful entry or search. Of course, police would have little reason to fear a
lawsuit, given the Court’s exaltation of police officers’ qualified immunity from
civil liability.16
Cook is right that the remedies for Fourth Amendment violations are
inadequate, neither deterring wrongful searches and seizures nor compensating
for them. But the larger story she tells also illustrates that in the Court’s hands,
the right itself has been interpreted too ungenerously. The problem is not just
with the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one’s home, which Cook
targets.
The Fourth Amendment also promises people “[t]he right . . . to be secure in
their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”17 The Court’s
decisions, even if complied with, would not make people of color “secure in
their persons.” Noting that “[b]eing killed by police is a leading cause of death
among young men of color,”18 Cook recounts a history of police violence that
inflicts a cultural trauma on the Black community.19 This history makes it
reasonable for people of color to fear any encounter with the police, and certainly
one involving a stop, arrest, or search. That is why Black children are
customarily given “The Talk” about what to do when stopped by the police.20

14
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). Cook maintains that Taylor’s
case was the unusual one where the search warrant application was so woefully deficient that
the police could not have relied in good faith on the warrant. Cook, supra note 1, at 45-47.
15
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (holding that a temporary guest
in an apartment does not have standing to challenge a search of the apartment).
16
The Court has produced a long line of decisions recognizing that police and other law
enforcement officers are immune from civil liability for alleged Fourth Amendment
violations, especially those involving excessive force, except in extremely limited
circumstances. See generally, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019)
(upholding officers’ qualified immunity in excessive force case); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7 (2015) (upholding officer’s qualified immunity for shooting fleeing fugitive); Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (upholding officers’ qualified immunity for shooting driver of
fleeing car); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (holding deputy immune from liability for
excessive use of force in forcing driver off road during chase); Osagie K. Obasogie & Anna
Zaret, Plainly Incompetent: How Qualified Immunity Became an Exculpatory Doctrine of
Police Excessive Force, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 407 (2022) (tracing development of qualified
immunity doctrine in cases where police allegedly violated the Fourth Amendment by using
excessive force).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18
Cook, supra note 1, at 73.
19
Id. at 66-78.
20
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Anthony V. Alfieri, (Re)Framing Race in Civil Rights
Lawyering, 130 YALE L.J. 2052, 2058 (2021) (reviewing HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY
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Can anyone believe that people of color confronted by the police will feel
secure in their persons as long as the police stay within the confines of the Fourth
Amendment case law—for example, that people of color will not fear for their
safety as long as the use of special weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) teams and
other militarized police action abides by the Court’s decisions? Suppose that the
LMPD officers, this time having a valid warrant in hand, announced themselves
moments before breaking down Taylor’s door. The police would probably have
set off precisely the same explosion of violence: someone inside Taylor’s
apartment fires a gun kept for self-defense, as may predictably occur after the
Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller21 that individuals have a Second
Amendment right to bear arms.22 Then responding to the danger that the police
created, the police fire back.
One does not have to be a critical race theorist—and I am not—to think that
the Fourth Amendment, by its terms, must be read to take into account the
history of racially motivated police violence against people of color. Accounting
for this history, a robust Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would protect the
right of all members of the political community, including people of color, to be
“secure in their persons” by restraining the police so that police conducting
searches and seizures would not unreasonably put people in fear for their
personal safety. Doing this work reasonably means reducing risks and threats of
physical harm, not escalating them. For example, even if the LMPD officers had
grounds to search Taylor’s apartment for drugs, it would have been unreasonable
to do so at night, when the police could have known she was home and likely in
bed, rather than earlier in the day when she was at work.
The public should breathe life into the Fourth Amendment by insisting that
states acknowledge and respect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons” as a collective right of all the people all of the time, not just as a right
for individuals occasionally to invoke in court.23 The Court’s constitutional
ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW (2019))
(describing “The Talk” as “an intergenerational script of advice and warnings by black parents
and nonblack parents of black children that is designed to prepare black kids for surviving the
police stops they will encounter in our racist society”).
21
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
22
Id. at 635.
23
In referring to the Fourth Amendment as a collective right, I do not mean to suggest that
it would be reasonable to limit individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights to protect the public’s
collective security. By way of comparison, see Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment
as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 255, 256 (2010). On the contrary, I argue for an
expansive (if not wholly judicially unenforceable) reading of the right—one that restrains
unreasonable police conduct that threatens the personal security of members of the political
community collectively, not just the personal security of any particular individual. I am also
not arguing here that the concept of the Fourth Amendment as a collective right would justify
one person in seeking a remedy for the violation of another’s rights. By way of comparison,
see Donald L. Doernberg, “The Right of the People”: Reconciling Collective and Individual
THE
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jurisprudence rarely offers a way to hold police accountable for practices that
make broad swaths of the population, and particularly people of color, feel
personally insecure—for example, baseless and pretextual stops of pedestrians
and drivers, or the use of military weaponry and other excessive force in making
arrests and conducting searches. Recurring reports of racially motivated policing
that people find traumatic are surely just the tip of the iceberg.24 There is a
constitutional imperative for states to restrain police conduct that unreasonably
erodes people’s collective, as well as individual, sense of security.
Concern for people’s collective security may justify a broader interpretation
of individuals’ enforceable rights under the Fourth Amendment.25 But when
talking about policing, it is fair to call out unreasonably threatening police
practices as Fourth Amendment violations, regardless of whether the Supreme
Court acknowledges individual rights and remedies. Not all constitutional rights
are individual and not all are justiciable. The Constitution may establish
nonjusticiable collective rights (as the Second Amendment was thought to do
pre-Heller) no less than judicially enforceable individual rights. The Fourth
Amendment does establish individual rights, but it may also establish a more
demanding right of the people collectively, which the public should insist be
respected.
An extrajudicial constitutional jurisprudence on the people’s collective right
to be “secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”
does not depend on a radical interpretative approach. On the contrary, a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence saying that the police may not create an unreasonable
risk or threat of physical harm to others would be true to the words of the Fourth
Amendment. Freedom from the apprehension of harm to one’s person is
precisely what the Fourth Amendment promises us as a people. And to the extent
that one looks to common law understandings for guidance, they reinforce this
expectation. The common law tort of assault was meant, in general, to protect
people against threats to personal safety, even if nineteenth-century common law
courts could not have contemplated precisely how the police would one day
make people fear for their lives.
A public conversation about minority communities’ rights to be protected, not
put in fear, by the police, might help loosen the Court’s grip on the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. It is important to move the conversation outside the
Court because some or most of its current members envision the Fourth
Amendment as less of an antimajoritarian right of vulnerable people to personal

Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 261 (2008), and David Gray,
Collective Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 77, 97-103 (2018).
24
See, e.g., Kurt Streeter, Trauma Brought By a Traffic Stop May Never Fade, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2022, at B8 (recounting Georgia sheriff’s deputies’ stop of bus of mostly Black
college lacrosse players in 2022 and the author’s similar experiences years earlier).
25
See, e.g., David Gray, Collective Rights and the Fourth Amendment After Carpenter, 79
MD. L. REV. 66, 66-67 (2019); Richard H. McAdams, Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper
Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 340-41 (1985).
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security and more of a landowner’s property right that protects against physical
trespasses, much as the Takings Clause protects against outright confiscations.
For example, with seemingly low regard for individuals’ interests in personal
security, Justice Gorsuch joined a 5-4 decision holding that the parents of a
fifteen-year-old Mexican child gunned down by a Border Patrol agent could not
seek compensation,26 and wrote a dissent asserting that the Fourth Amendment
allowed officers to fire thirteen shots at a driver (who thought she was escaping
carjackers), hitting her twice in the back, because she was still able to keep
driving (trying to get herself to a hospital) and therefore she was never
“seized.”27 But on the other hand, in a case the Court decided not to review,
Justice Gorsuch lamented that game wardens approaching a rural residence to
ask the owners about illegal deer hunting may have stayed too long or strayed
too far from the path to the front door to satisfy an earlier precedent.28
The Justices’ predispositions are unlikely to change any time soon, but
legislative change is possible. The silver lining in Cook’s account is that in the
aftermath of Taylor’s death, Louisville passed Breonna’s Law, and other
jurisdictions proposed similar laws, to regulate how the police execute searches,
including by banning no-knock warrants.29 That is a measure of how
recognizably awful the police conduct was in Breonna Taylor’s case. Cook
advocates further reforms, not all requiring legislation, to redress the
inadequacies of Fourth Amendment case law.30 That may be an uphill battle,
because Bill of Rights provisions such as the Fourth Amendment protect
minority rights precisely because minorities lack equal power at the voting
booth.31 But it is a battle worth fighting, and perhaps it will be aided by a robust
public understanding of the Fourth Amendment that differs from the current
Court’s understanding—one that takes a more generous view of peoples’ right
“to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

26

Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740, 749-50 (2020).
Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 1003 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
28
Bovat v. Vermont, 141 S. Ct. 22, 22-23 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
29
Cook, supra note 1, at 63-64.
30
Id. at 78-85.
31
Perhaps legislation is less challenging to achieve when it aims to restrain police conduct
targeting everyone relatively equally. For example, most people carry cell phones and use
computers and have a stake in keeping their data private, so one might expect legislation to
adequately protect people from unreasonable searches of electronic data. But much of the
police conduct threatening people’s individual and collective sense of security targets people
with the least political clout.
27

